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THE HEAVENS ARE ALWAYS FALLEN:   
A NEO-CONSTITUTIVE APPROACH TO 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL SOCIETY 
GEOFFREY DANCY & CHRISTOPHER FARISS * 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the year 2018, on the 70th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, populist movements are assaulting global norms. While this may 
be expected in countries like Venezuela1, The Philippines2, Russia3, or South 
Africa4, hyper-nationalist campaigns have ripped through the heart of the 
Western world as well. Austria, Finland, Hungary, Norway, Poland, and 
Switzerland are all now governed by coalitions that include right-wing, populist 
parties.5 Germany’s fascist Alternative for Germany (AfD) party won seats in the 
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1. See Christopher Sabatini & Jimena Galindo, It’s Not Just Venezuela. Elected Governments Don’t 
Necessarily Defend Democracy or Protect Human Rights, WASHINGTON POST: MONKEY CAGE BLOG 
(Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/11/its-not-just-
venezuela-elected-governments-do-not-necessarily-defend-democracy-or-protect-human-
rights/?utm_term=.0e0ea21d3a22 [https://perma.cc/UG6D-7F6P] (reporting on Venezuela’s tendency to 
rebuke human rights regimes); Solidarity with the People?, GLOBAL AMERICANS, 
https://theglobalamericans.org/reports/ 
solidarity-with-the-people/ [https://perma.cc/9NVT-CSBS] (last visited Jan. 1, 2018) (reporting that 
Venezuela has sought to bolster human rights violating nations in the past). 
2.  See Jessica Trisko Darden & Christopher J. Fariss, Duterte Has Put Part of the Philippines Under 
Martial Law. Here’s How Dangerous that Can Be, WASHINGTON POST: MONKEY CAGE BLOG (June 14, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/14/the-philippines-is-under-
martial-law-heres-how-that-can-be-dangerous-for-democracy/?utm_term=.e98a8f418b70 
[https://perma.cc/6675-P9UX] (Last visited Jan. 1, 2018) (reporting on Philippine’s President Rodrigo 
Duterte’s recent imposition of martial law). 
3.  See John Keane, History of Russian Populism Provides Important Lessons for Today, THE 
CONVERSATION (Oct. 23, 2016), https://theconversation.com/history-of-russian-populism-provides-
important-lessons-for-today-67476 [https://perma.cc/5CW2-A249] (last visited Jan. 1, 2018) (chronicling 
Russia’s history of populist politics). 
4.  See Chris Saunders & Henning Melber, Populism on the Rise as South Africa and Namibia Gear 
up to Elect New Presidents, THE CONVERSATION (May 25, 2017), http://theconversation.com/populism-
on-the-rise-as-south-africa-and-namibia-gear-up-to-elect-new-presidents-77887 
[https://perma.cc/Q2RB-3EVC] (last visited Jan. 1, 2018) (reporting on the prominence of populism in 
South Africa’s recent elections); South Africa, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH https://www.hrw.org/ 
africa/south-africa  [https://perma.cc/A5YJ-M4JV] (last visited Dec. 27, 2017). 
5.  Michael Bröning, The Rise of Populism in Europe, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (June 3, 2016),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2016-06-03/rise-populism-europe [https://perma.cc/FS57-
HYPW] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017). 
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Bundestag in September 2017. The British government negotiates to leave the 
European Union, while still endeavoring to repeal the country’s Human Rights 
Law.6 And the United States, long seen as the steward of global liberalism, adopts 
an openly transactional approach to foreign policy7—allying with wealthy 
despots,8 demanding supplication from foreign aid recipients at the United 
Nations,9 and intentionally avoiding even passing mentions to human rights in 
speech or in action.10 
Though today’s national populist movements have very different policy 
priorities—and evince only a passing resemblance to populist politics of 
yesteryear—they share certain crucial features: a profound disdain for experts, a 
desire to limit exchange with cultural outsiders, and skepticism toward global 
rules and institutions.11 What does the rise of populism mean for the future of 
human rights law and practice? 
One answer is that the rise of populism is the beginning of the end. In this 
formulation, human rights, humanitarian, and international criminal legal 
regimes are in a crisis.12 It is just a matter of time before these institutions will 
break under the weight of cruel political reality and become irrelevant. It is also 
possible that they have already broken, and we in fact live in a “post-human rights 
world.”13 The question of whether to do justice even if the heavens should fall is 
now moot. The heavens have already fallen. 
 
 6.  Conor Gearty, The Human Rights Act Should Not Be Repealed, U.K. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
BLOG, (Sept. 17, 2016), https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/09/17/conor-gearty-the-human-rights-act-
should-not-be-repealed/ [https://perma.cc/Y6MM-CS76]; Alan Travis, UK Would Have to Declare State 
of Emergency to Change Human Rights Laws, THE GUARDIAN, June 7, 2017. 
 7.  Jack Goldsmith, The Trump Onslaught on International Law and Institutions, LAWFARE  
(Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-onslaught-international-law-and-institutions 
[https://perma.cc/EYQ4-925P] (last visited Mar. 20, 2017). 
 8.  Aaron Blake, Analysis | Trump’s Praise for Authoritarians vs. His Platitudes for Allies, 
WASHINGTON POST, May 9, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/05/09/trumps-
praise-for-strongmen-vs-his-muted-posture-toward-allies/ [https://perma.cc/8YD3-S3JB] (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2017). 
 9.  Mark Landler, Trump Threatens to End American Aid: ‘We’re Watching Those Votes’ at the U.N., 
THE NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/world/middleeast/trump-
threatens-to-end-american-aid-were-watching-those-votes-at-the-un.html [https://perma.cc/Z72T-
RXQN] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017). 
 10.  Nahal Toosi, Leaked Memo Schooled Tillerson on Human Rights, POLITICO, Dec. 19, 2017, 
http://politi.co/2Benzkc [https://perma.cc/3LQA-94M3] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017). 
 11.  Yascha Mounk, European Disunion, THE NEW REPUBLIC (July 19, 2017), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/143604/european-disunion-rise-populist-movements-means-democracy 
[https://perma.cc/2RNX-SLUN] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).  
 12.  César Rodríguez Garavito & Sean Luna McAdams, A Human Rights Crisis? Unpacking the 
Debate on the Future of the Human Rights Field (2016) (unpublished manuscript) available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2919703 [https://perma.cc/BD9Q-CLUC]. For ease 
of exposition, we refer to these three regimes throughout the paper as “international human rights 
institutions,” or “human rights institutions.” 
 13.  AMITAI ETZIONI, HOT SPOTS: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A POST-HUMAN-RIGHTS 
WORLD (2012); Ingrid Wuerth, A Global Downturn in Human Rights: Implications for International 
Law, LAWFARE (June 27, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/global-downturn-human-rights-
implications-international-law [https://perma.cc/PWV8-DDMH]. 
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In support of this worldview critical observers argue that the human rights 
legal regime is too rigid to adapt to new circumstances,14 that it makes little direct 
contribution to social change,15 that it generates counter-productive political 
backlash,16 and that it is too easily hijacked by those favoring a politics of 
domination.17 All of this translates into human rights institution fatigue, as well 
as withering support.18 In advancing these arguments, scholars from across 
disciplines—including history, political science, and economics—challenge 
human rights law to reckon with the inescapable realities of politics. As this 
article will explain in greater depth, criticism like this, rooted in various forms of 
legal realism, can mean two different things: that human rights law and practice 
is a-political, to its detriment; or that human rights law and practice is very 
political, to its detriment. In the first instance, the goal is to show that human 
rights work is naïve because of its exclusive focus on liberal legalist ideals. In the 
second instance, the goal is to show that human rights law is corrupted because it 
deviates from normative purity in practice. 
This Article outlines and advances an alternative viewpoint: the human rights 
legal regime and global political society are mutually constitutive. We call our 
approach neo-constitutive.19 Under this approach, concern for rights is deeply 
embedded in transnational practices, and it will not be easily erased. Rather than 
calling human rights hollow or corrupt, we seek to understand why and how 
rights-based legal claims emerge and operate in today’s world. This approach is 
still consistent with legal realism, and is decidedly not utopian. For a neo-
constitutive thinker, human rights will not bring us to heaven, nor will they lead 
the heavens to fall. Instead, the heavens are always fallen. But this does not mean 
that human rights law and activism have no role to play in altering political 
interactions or limiting human suffering. 
Critical arguments about the nature human rights law that have emerged over 
the last two decades are remarkably similar to those made in an earlier period of 
scholarly and policy discourse within American law and society literature that 
dates back to the 1970s. Arch-critiques of liberal legalism within Critical Legal 
Studies (CLS) and neo-institutionalist (NI) traditions provided a context for 
 
 14.  SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010). 
 15.  ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014); Adam S. Chilton & Eric A. 
Posner, The Influence of History on States’ Compliance with Human Rights Obligations (Coase-Sandor 
Working Paper Series in L. and Econ. No. 719, 2015). 
 16.  Stephen Hopgood, Jack L. Snyder, & Leslie Vinjamuri, Introduction: Human Rights Past, 
Present, and Future, in THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Stephen Hopgood, Jack L. Snyder, & Leslie 
Vinjamuri eds., 2017). 
 17.  NICOLA PERUGINI & NEVE GORDON, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO DOMINATE (2015). 
 18.  Stephen Hopgood, Fascism Rising, OPENDEMOCRACY (Nov. 9, 2016), 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/stephen-hopgood/fascism-rising 
[https://perma.cc/Z6MH-HFFP] (last visited Mar. 19, 2017). 
 19.  The term constitutive is a reference to the work of Stuart Scheingold, which is described in 
Section III. Meant to indicate that law and politics are mutually constitutive, this usage should not be 
confused with other relevant uses of the term, like constitutive norms or the constitutive theory of 
statehood.  
BOOK PROOF-  DANCY FARISS - NEOCONSTITUTIVE APPROACH (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2018  8:41 PM 
76 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 81:73 
rethinking the narrative of progress attached to civil rights legal successes, like 
Brown v. Board of Education. CLS was broadly interpretive, where NI was 
variable-oriented. Yet both depicted a domestic legal terrain that held little 
promise for those struggling against oppressive structures. Out of these traditions 
emerged the neo-constitutive approach, which simultaneously accepts the 
fraught and political nature of law but still isolates productive mechanisms in 
rights-based legal practice. These mechanisms, which include hard-to-measure 
concepts like stigma and fear of social sanction, are difficult to observe 
systematically across different political and legal contexts, but have proven 
impactful. The lessons from the neo-constitutive approach to civil rights are 
relevant for understanding debates about international human rights law in the 
current environment. In short, human rights scholarship should embrace thinking 
that takes seriously the way that law and politics behavior shape each other over 
time. 
II 
CIVIL RIGHTS FATIGUE YESTERDAY, HUMAN RIGHTS FATIGUE TODAY 
The international human rights regime has faced a number of broadside 
attacks over the last few years, but two of the most powerful are Eric Posner’s 
The Twilight of Human Rights Law (2014) and Stephen Hopgood’s The Endtimes 
of Human Rights (2013).20 Similar in title, these volumes converge in two major 
respects: they both counsel abandonment of human rights law for the sake of 
human betterment, and they do so prior to the populist resurgence of 2016. 
Though these tracts may come to be seen as the twin harbingers of the post-
human-rights world, the authors’ approaches—like their personal and 
intellectual profiles—diverge radically. 
A. The Posner Approach 
Eric Posner’s thinking is framed around the top-down causal impact of 
international legalization. The fundamental problem—Posner states matter-of-
factly—is “that human rights law has failed to accomplish its objectives. More 
precisely, there is little evidence that human rights treaties, on the whole, have 
improved the well-being of people . . . . ”21 Crucially, Posner does not claim that 
the human condition has failed to improve since the earliest moves toward 
codification of the first international human rights covenants. Instead, his 
intention is to challenge the direct link between multilateral treaties and domestic 
political change. Though he constructs no statistical models or controlled 
comparisons, Posner confidently claims that the factors responsible for progress 
over the last four decades are the collapse of communism, the spread of the 
democracy, and economic growth.22 As such, progressive activists would make 
 
 20.  POSNER, supra note 15; STEPHEN HOPGOOD, THE ENDTIMES OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2013). 
 21.  POSNER, supra note 15, at 7. 
 22.  Id. at 26. 
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good on human rights by no longer focusing on the intricacies of rules attached 
to a ballooning list of protected rights—what he calls rights “hypertrophy”23—
and instead experimenting with development economics. Implied in this tidy 
presentation of material are two unstated claims: first, that human rights law is 
separable and independent from other sources of global change like democracy; 
and second, that the pursuit of legal tactics represents a tradeoff with other, more 
economical and effective tactics for on-the-ground intervention. 
One might draw a direct line between Posner’s approach to human rights law 
and the approach to civil rights law adopted by Gerald Rosenberg in the 1991 
volume The Hollow Hope.24 Rosenberg fixates on the observable effects of top-
down phenomena, most notably the US Supreme Court decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education. Finding that significant increases in the rate of school 
desegregation and black voting did not occur until the late 1960s—over a decade 
after the landmark 1954 decision—Rosenberg concludes that court orders 
themselves are not catalysts for social change. Like Posner after him, Rosenberg 
finds an alternative factor to be more impactful. National legislation, he argues, 
outweighs the contribution of litigation. Specifically, because the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act were more temporally proximate to 
observable increases in mixed school enrollment and black voter registration, 
they are more causally powerful variables.25 Also like Posner, Rosenberg 
extrapolates from his research that rights-based litigation is probably not the best 
tactic for activists who want to make good on rights. 
This counterfactual claim is neo-institutionalist in nature because it highlights 
“the interactions between courts, legislatures, and public opinion.”26 Neo-
institutionalists consider each component of their argument as an independent 
variable whose causal power can be estimated, and note the long delay between 
the legal intervention and its intended effect on measurable outcomes. However, 
regardless of whether its object of focus is constitutional law or human rights law, 
academic writing in this vein shares two main characteristics. The first is a 
conservative posture: they function to remind readers of the political “feasibility 
constraints” that limit the reach of rights-based legal action.27 That is, politics 
trumps law. 
American institutionalists have maintained this line of reasoning for decades. 
In 1957, Robert Dahl wrote, “by itself, the Court is almost powerless to affect the 
 
 23.  Id. at 91. 
 24.  GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE (2nd ed. 2008). We are not aware of anyone else who has drawn a connection between 
Rosenberg and Posner, but for an application of Rosenberg’s thought to questions of compliance with 
international human rights law, see BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 134 (2009). 
 25.  ROSENBERG, supra note 24, at 51–61. For other work advancing a similar argument, see 
ROSENBERG, supra note 24, at 51–61. 
 26.  Kenneth Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering in the Era Before “Brown,” 115 YALE L.J. 
256, 260 (2005). 
 27.  Laura Valentini, In What Sense Are Human Rights Political? A Preliminary Exploration, 60 POL. 
STUD. 180, 181 (2012).   
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course of national policy.”28 In 2014, Eric Posner’s message about human rights 
sounds much the same: “Realistically, one can have little confidence that the 
treaties have improved people’s lives.”29 
A second feature of this kind of work is that its epistemology—which leans 
toward social science positivism—employs a model of causal inference based on 
Humean regularity: X causes Y if it precedes it; if X is present, and Y is not, no 
cause is present.30 Because the Brown v. Board of Education decision (X) was not 
immediately followed by desegregation (Y), it did not cause it. Similarly, because 
human rights treaty ratifications (X) are not always followed improved human 
rights practices (Y), they do not cause such changes. 
B. The Hopgood Approach 
In this, the work of neo-institutionalists like Posner is different from the 
critical-theoretic approach adopted by Stephen Hopgood in The Endtimes of 
Human Rights. There are no charts in Hopgood’s book, and while he makes 
frequent reference to trends, he does not present quantitative data. Hopgood’s 
interpretivist epistemology is less beholden to efforts at causal inference; instead, 
his method is to study meanings within the contemporary zeitgeist, through which 
he discovers a manifest aversion to institutionalism.31 The downfall of the human 
rights legal project, he contends, is sown in its fixation on erecting a universal 
humanist church that raises funds, builds courts, and markets atrocity. This 
hollow empire32 exposes its weakness each time it intervenes and butts heads with 
local religious and political authorities. 
It is hard to do justice to the book, which is one part history of the humanistic 
impulse in the Western cultural-legal tradition and one part jeremiad against 
soulless technicism in human rights work. While Hopgood is no quantitative 
impact assessor, he is interested in the effects of law on global society, and in 
people’s ordinary lives. For our purposes, three of Hopgood’s broadly empirical 
claims stand out: (1) That global human rights norms are contingent—the relic of 
a particular historical moment in which American and European powers were 
ascendant. As such, rights are relative rather than universal.33 (2) That human 
rights norms reify experiences of atrocity, converting the facts of human misery 
into abstract metanarratives that justify the expansion of a global “policing 
infrastructure.”34 And (3) that human rights laws and claims are becoming less 
useful over time because the source of their supposed authority is now exposed 
 
 28.  Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, 50 EMORY L.J. 563, 580 (2001).  
 29.  POSNER, supra note 15, at 78. 
 30.  Henry E. Brady, Causation and Explanation in Social Science, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
POLITICAL SCIENCE (Robert E. Goodin ed. 2011).  
 31.  HOPGOOD, supra note 20, at 18. 
 32.  Id. at 145. 
 33.  Id. at 19, 66. On relativity, see also J. A. Lindgren Alves, The Declaration of Human Rights in 
Postmodernity, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 478–500 (2000). 
 34.  HOPGOOD, supra note 20, at 57.  
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as a kind of social magic trick with shaky foundations.35 
With these claims, Endtimes echoes a critique of rights-advanced scholars 
within the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement. CLS was a left-progressive 
intellectual school that first emerged in the late 1970s.36 Influenced by Marxist 
theory and sociology, CLS probed the race, gender, and class hierarchies that 
pervade the practice of law. For CLS, jurisprudence in America is simply unable 
to deliver on social justice—or to promote equality—because it is dogged by 
contradictions inherent in liberal conceptions of legal rights. By 1984, works in 
this vein were numerous enough to warrant the publication of a bibliography in 
Yale Law Journal with hundreds of entries.37 In that same year, in an act of 
creative destruction, Mark Tushnet produced a radical critique of liberal rights.38 
Tushnet’s position centers on a virtually identical set of complaints that pulses 
through Hopgood’s Endtimes thirty years later: (1) Specific articulations of rights, 
like the right to reproductive choice, are contingent to specific “social and 
technological facts,” outside of which they would make no sense.39 Ergo, they are 
relative, not universal. (2) Rights talk converts concrete human experiences of 
“solidarity and individuality” into an abstract language, losing meaning in the 
process of reification.40 And (3) rights are an effective tool only when deployed 
against ignorant opponents, or so long as they escape capture by powerful 
interests. But the headway made by rights claimants halts the moment that one’s 
enemies themselves “discover the critique of rights.”41 
Whether there is a direct intellectual lineage between the contemporary arch-
critics of human rights highlighted above and the American neo-institutionalists 
and CLS progenitors from decades past remains indeterminate—though some 
other scholars stake out a position against both civil rights and human rights 
traditions.42 However, these connections show that critiques of human rights in 
global society resemble critiques of legal rights in American society. Where neo-
institutionalists find little hope in the direct effect of major court rulings using 
quantitative measures of social outcomes, they also see little comparative 
evidence of a positive effect for human rights treaty ratification. Where critical 
legal scholars see in the American myth of rights a disguise for power structures 
that prevent social justice, they also see a myth of human rights amplified onto 
 
 35.  Id. at 7, 117. See also Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights, REGIME 
THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Volker Rittberger & Peter Mayer eds., 1993). 
 36.  The earliest stirrings of the CLS movement were published earlier. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why 
the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. SOC. REV. (1974). 
 37.  Duncan Kennedy & Karl E. Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461–
490 (1984). 
 38.  Mark Tushnet, Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363 (1984). 
 39.  Id. at 1370. 
 40.  Id. at 1383. 
 41.  Id. at 1386. 
 42.  Wendy Brown, for example, devotes energy to problematizing both American civil rights 
discourse as well as human rights discourse. WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND 
FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY (1995); Wendy Brown, ‘“The Most We Can Hope For. . .”: Human 
Rights and the Politics of Fatalism,’ 193 SOUTH ATL. Q. 451–63 (2004). 
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global society, meant to rationalize Western cultural and material domination. 
Furthermore, and perhaps surprising given that they employ different research 
methods and come from different ends of the left-right continuum, neo-
institutional critiques and critical legal criticism converge around a central 
precept: that liberal legalism is to blame. 
C. Liberal Legalism & The Problem of Politics 
It is not uncommon for neo-institutionalists and critical theorists to make 
frequent reference to one another. For instance, in the American context, critical 
race theorist Lani Guinier cites The Hollow Hope to bolster the claim that 
ultimately Brown v. Board failed in its purpose.43 In the international context, 
this kind of cross-pollination is also apparent: Eric Posner cites to critical work 
that questions the contingent foundations of human rights,44 and Stephen 
Hopgood cites empirical institutional research in order to make claims about 
rights outcomes.45 While this may seem curious given their often different 
ontological and epistemological commitments, the reason for their alliance is 
clear: they have a common enemy in liberal legalism. 
Liberal legalism is the attitude that moral and political conduct can be 
converted into a matter of rights rule-making and rule-following.46 Insofar as 
movements for social change hold rights legalization and litigation as their 
primary aims, they may be called liberal legalist. Legalism, and the unthinking 
faith in lawyers and courts that it promotes, is anathema to critics. For neo-
institutionalists, litigating rights in courts is a waste of resources because it 
distracts from other avenues of social change—including legislation—that are 
more productive.47 For critical theorists, cause-lawyering removes political 
disputes to a stuffy forum that plays to the strength of conservative legal actors 
who then coopt, divert, or subvert the energies of movements for social justice.48 
Ultimately, the positions of the Neo-institutionalists and Critical Legal 
scholars both end with the same bleak conclusion that rights legalization has a 
political problem. However, they argue this point in opposite ways. For 
institutional thinkers, legalists are “rule naïve,”49 unaware that their program to 
 
 43.  We think of critical race theory as being a particular offshoot of CLS. Lani Guinier, From Racial 
Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Divergence Dilemma, 91 J. 
AM. HIST. 92, 93 (2004). 
 44.  POSNER, supra note 15, at 10–20. 
 45.  HOPGOOD, supra note 20, at 14. 
 46.  See generally JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS AND POLITICAL TRIALS 1 (1986). 
For the related but slightly different term “legal liberalism,” see LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE 
CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1998). 
 47.  See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 23; Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic 
Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531–76 (1992); ROBERT A. 
KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2003). 
 48.  Guinier, supra note 44; Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980). 
 49.  POSNER, supra note 15, at 7; See also ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 
(2009). 
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advance a progressive agenda using law will inevitably be stymied by more 
fundamental political forces. Removed from the arena of participatory 
democracy, legalists engage in a hopelessly a-political exercise. They are 
formalists who endeavor toward meaningful political action, but get bogged in 
legal incrementalism. For critical thinkers, in contrast, legalists seek to escape 
politics for an arena of pure morality, untainted by the perversions of political 
interests. However, the legal sphere is laden with power and is inseparable from 
politics. In the neo-institutionalist formulation, legal analysts seek a rational 
politics and find themselves isolated within the peculiar world of law. In the 
critical formulation, natural legalists seek a pristine moral order and find only 
dirty politics. The difference is ontological: in the first account, law and politics 
are in fact separate social spheres; in the second, law and politics are mutually 





The problem of politics is still a fresh new challenge for the study of human 
rights law, evidenced by the number of new volumes devoted to it.50 However, 
American law and society scholars confronted these issues a long time ago, and 
they responded by folding political and economic structures into their empirical 
analyses of the impact of legalization. What has resulted is a third type of legal 
realism that is neither explicitly institutionalist nor wholly critical. It accepts the 
structural assumptions of CLS. However, it also endeavors to quantify 
systematically the impact of legal action using empirical evidence that accounts 
for and accommodates the amount of measurement precision that is possible, 
conditional on the quality of the available information. As explained in the next 
section, this is a neo-constitutive approach to law (See Figure 1). Such an 
 
 50.  Geoff Dancy & Christopher J. Fariss, Rescuing Human Rights Law from International Legalism 
and its Critics, 39 HUM. RTS. Q. 1–36 (2017).  
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approach should be applied to human rights law because it takes seriously both 
the ontological and epistemological goals of these competing intellectual 
agendas. 
III 
A NEO-CONSTITUTIVE APPROACH TO RIGHTS IN LAW 
A. Civil Rights and the Origins of Constitutive Thinking 
The intuition behind a constitutive approach to human rights law is that law 
and politics are not separate, or separable, spheres within society. Individuals 
have agency when generating preferences and taking actions in both spheres. It 
is true that legal reasoning possesses special qualities; that judges and lawyers 
adopt unique professional norms; and that the courtroom is distinct from a town 
hall, a parliament, or a boardroom. However, the process of legal claim-making, 
the mobilization of resources on behalf of legal causes, and the issuance of a court 
ruling are political acts. These acts occur within institutions designed to help 
define who gets what in society and specifies which behaviors are permissible in 
the pursuit of social ends. Instead of treating rights-based institutions as social 
units that mechanistically produce outcomes in independent and linear fashion, 
we must study how norms and institutions generate relations that both “constrain 
and facilitate the reflexive actions of research subjects.”51 Hence the term 
“constitutive”: legal institutions and political behavior constitute one another. 
This is not particularly controversial today, yet it was a break from legal 
tradition to take seriously the notion that law and political society are imbricated 
or layered so extensively as to resist separate consideration. As of the late 1950s, 
Americans were “not quite willing to accept the fact that [the Supreme Court] is 
a political institution and not quite capable of denying it…”52 By the 1980s, this 
had changed. Part of this shift can be attributed to Stuart Scheingold, whose The 
Politics of Rights (1974) assessed the pervasiveness of the myth of rights in 
American society. For Scheingold, legal rights in America are simultaneously 
expressed as ideals, rules, and behaviors: “To think in terms of the mythic and 
ideological properties of rights is to see them as constitutive of, rather than simply 
a reflection of, social practice.”53 Thus, to Scheingold, rights are not ends in 
themselves, but tools of political mobilization.54 
Originally, this work was a corrective to civil rights research that may have 
inflated the progressive qualities of legal action in the Warren Court era. Legal 
activists and commentators alike had viewed civil rights jurisprudence through 
rose-tinted glasses, paying too little attention to unintended consequences. A 
 
 51.  Michael McCann, Causal versus Constitutive Explanations (or, On the Difficulty of Being so 
Positive), 21 LAW SOC. INQ. 457, 462 (1996).  
 52.  Dahl, supra note 28, at 563. 
 53.  STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND 
POLITICAL CHANGE xxi (2d ed. 2011).  
 54.  Id. at 148. 
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second contribution was to shift law, in social science terms, from a dependent 
variable to an independent variable. Rather than studying the changes to law 
itself, scholars would focus on how those changes translated into social outcomes. 
Those studying these questions would fork into the two schools explained above: 
variable-centered Neo-institutionalism or interpretive Critical Legal Studies. 
By the turn of the 21st Century, though, American legal realism faced three 
big problems. First, it had been fighting a straw man. The common source of 
theorists’ ire—unthinking liberal legalism—is difficult to find in the real world.55 
Few activists or lawyers actually advocate the position that expanding rights 
protections will alone be sufficient to address society’s greatest ills. It is hardly 
the case that the cause lawyers behind Brown v. Board were committed liberal 
legalists. In a lengthy exploration of archival evidence, Kenneth Mack finds that 
the NAACP’s tactics of litigation were embedded within a larger race uplift 
strategy that contained other non-legal goals like social mobilization and 
economic self-sufficiency.56 Not even those lawyers who scored one of the 
greatest legal victories in history thought that such a ruling would be a magic 
bullet. 
Second, legal realism went too far. Leaning heavily toward a “negative 
critique aimed at delegitimation,”57 rather than an explicit endorsement of new 
strategies for creating social change, it became a scorched earth intellectual 
approach. There are instances where Neo-institutionalists and Critical legal 
scholars attempt to provide alternatives to a politics of rights. These alternatives 
tend to be totalizing, advocating for the erasure of common practice, or a 
wholesale reconceptualization of standing laws and norms. For instance: instead 
of using rights, scholars should use another language altogether to articulate legal 
and political claims.58 Because a consciousness shift of this magnitude is 
impractical, such proposals fall short as “guides to action.”59 
Third and relatedly, despite the fact that critics have for decades questioned 
the utility of rights-talk and litigation, rights are still social technologies that 
command a great deal of attention, time, and resources. One need look no further 
than the LGBT movement, which won a series of significant legal and social 
victories in the last few years, even though scholars like Gerald Rosenberg had 
declared this effort all but dead as of 2008.60 Rights claims are resilient, and they 
stick around. Ignoring that fact means ignoring real-world phenomena that need 
explaining. 
In the face of these problems, a group of law and society researchers have 
 
 55.  Dancy & Fariss, supra note 50.  
 56.  Mack, supra note 26. 
 57.  Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly 
Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509, 554 (1984). 
 58.  See, e.g., RAYMOND GEUSS, HISTORY AND ILLUSION IN POLITICS (2001). 
 59.  Benjamin L. McKean, What Makes a Utopia Inconvenient? On the Advantages and 
Disadvantages of a Realist Orientation to Politics, 110 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 876, 880 (2016). 
 60.  ROSENBERG, supra note 24, at Chs. 12-14. 
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adopted the neo-constitutive approach, which is infused with pragmatism.61 It is 
pragmatic because it recognizes the insights of legal realism—including the 
problem of politics—but does not counsel wholesale rejection of rights-based 
action. 
Charles Epp’s Making Rights Real illustrates this approach.62 Epp’s primary 
finding is that starting in the 1970s, the emerging threat of tort liability—and the 
fear of lawsuits it created—led to systematic organizational and behavioral 
changes in policing in the United States. For example, many police departments 
adopted rules allowing for deadly force only when used in defense of life, and 
they also provided for more misconduct training and oversight.63 These changes 
can only be explained by “the interaction between activist pressure for law-based 
reform and conflict within the managerial professions over how to respond.”64 
This illustrates three features of a neo-constitutive approach. First, it is possible 
to start with the premise that rights law is historically contingent and endogenous 
to relations of power yet avoid totalizing critique or rejection of rights-based 
strategies. For example, Epp recognizes that the United States has become more 
litigious over the last half century.65 He also accepts that the trend toward greater 
legalization does not act independently on society; it is caught between 
sensationalist media, frustrated citizens, and procrustean law enforcement 
institutions that endeavor toward greater social control.66 Still, he moves forward, 
tracing the evolution of legal practice and the way that it has influenced certain 
positive social outcomes like greater police transparency and lessened 
corruption. 
A second way that Epp’s work demonstrates a pragmatic, neo-constitutive 
approach is that, rather than asking whether the phenomenon of rights 
legalization causes social change, he instead asks a more open-ended question: 
how does rights legalization operate? In this sense, Epp relies less on a Humean 
regularity (covariance of X and Y), and more on mechanism-based causal 
inference. Mechanisms “are entities and activities organized such that they are 
productive of regular changes from start or setup to finish or termination 
conditions.”67 The task for mechanism-based explanations is to demonstrate the 
ways that certain actions are endogenously linked to others in a network of 
reactions (a complex causal process). While it would be very difficult to 
demonstrate systematically covariance between a rise in torts and police 
 
 61.  See generally Geoff Dancy, Human Rights Pragmatism: Belief, Inquiry, and Action, 22 EUR. J. 
INT’L. REL. 512 (2016).  
 62.  CHARLES EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE CREATION OF 
THE LEGALISTIC STATE (2009). 
 63.  Id. at Ch. 5. 
 64.  Id. at 14. See also generally Rachel Wahl, No Justice, No Peace?: The Police, People of Color, 
and the Paradox of Protecting Human Rights, 39 HUM. RTS. Q. 811 (2017).  
 65.  EPP, supra note 62, at 8. 
 66.  Id. at 15. 
 67.  Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver, Thinking about Mechanisms, 67 PHIL. SCI. 
1, 3 (2000). 
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departments’ internal reforms—especially because these changes occur in 
uneven and non-linear fashion—it is perhaps less difficult to trace mechanisms of 
influence. For instance, Epp shows that policing magazines started warning 
departments about legal liabilities in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and much of 
the alarm was caused not by actual lawsuits but by media-stoked fear that lawsuits 
were impending. Therefore, legalization in this milieu operated through a 
network of mechanisms involving rights mobilization, legal consciousness, and 
behavior-updating, all of which would be hidden from a nationwide study of the 
supposed causal covariation between the total number of torts across 
jurisdictions and the onset of police reform. For this complex causal process, one 
cannot draw a direct line between these macro-level variables; one can only draw 
a maze of vectors. 
Third, for a methodological pragmatist like Epp, embracing mechanisms and 
the insights behind a relational ontology does not mean abandoning social 
science methods, or forfeiting the language of causality or consequences.68 It does 
not mean one must wholeheartedly embrace postmodern types of research.69 In 
fact, one can make use of whatever methods necessary to provide evidentiary 
support to claims. Eclectic in style, Epp proves to be quite well-versed in various 
social science methods. He performs archival research, interviews, and surveys. 
He also frames many of his analyses in terms of independent and dependent 
variables. However, Epp never presumes that he must demonstrate global, linear 
predictions between torts and police reforms to make his case because he 
understands the contingent circumstances that relate the mechanisms he 
identifies to one another and to the ultimate policy adoption that is the focus of 
his inquiry. 
In short, adopting a neo-constitutive approach means seeing the world like a 
dense and dynamic network of relationships and working one’s way through 
them one mechanism at a time. The network of relationships is dense because the 
mechanisms influence one another both directly and indirectly, which is why it is 
conceptually problematic to consider the spheres of law and politics as separate. 
The network is dynamic because its structure changes as the interactions between 
mechanisms unfold over time. It is possible to study complex systems, particularly 
if experimental interventions are considered. The power of an experimental 
design comes from its ability to equalize the complex network of mechanisms 
across treatment and control groups. Without this, observers and analysts are 
forced to grapple with this complexity using other social science tools. 
B. Applied to Human Rights 
Human rights scholarship is very much stuck in the kinds of debates 
American law and society were having thirty years ago—about whether human 
rights law, as a whole, matters at all, or whether the whole artifice will soon 
 
 68.  Dancy, supra note 61. 
 69.  McCann, supra note 51. 
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crumble. Analyses that take human rights law seriously must regularly issue 
proclamations about whether the entire enterprise is worth saving.70 Meanwhile, 
critical and declinist works of the Posner and Hopgood variety are fine throwing 
out the human rights project in favor of developmentalist or public health 
agendas.71 Human rights scholarship is at an inflection point, and it should be 
steered in the direction of a pragmatic neo-constitutive approach. 
1. Rights Claims Are Popular 
The first assumption for a neo-constitutive approach to human rights is that 
rights claims are popular. The language of human rights is a political claim-
making discourse for judging governments and corporate actors.72 This discourse 
competes with others in the repertoire of contention, meaning that political 
actors must choose whether to root their demands in, among other things, the 
language of religious principles, sovereignty, national interest, the will of the 
people, political order, or social justice. All of these are conceptual apparatuses 
capable of challenging the authority of governing institutions or empowering 
claimants with respect to those institutions. However, human rights are rather 
popular relative to the others. The global volume of written and verbal references 
to human rights shows few signs of contraction, and the respect that local 
populations have for human rights organizations is higher than some would 
expect.73 In choosing which discourse to mobilize, many collective movements 
opt for human rights, whatever the flaws of that strategy. 
What explains the resilience of human rights claims? First, one could argue 
that the language of human rights is hegemonic; it is supported by the most 
powerful actors in the world, and it commands a great deal of cultural and 
material resources. A second explanation is that the act of claiming human rights 
possesses distinct properties that other political or legal speech acts lack. The 
usefulness of such claims, as the trend line below suggests, is increasing (See 
Figure 2). Rights claims confer duties on other individuals or groups to refrain 
from harm, provide goods, or perform other specified actions for the 
rightsholder.74 This is different from other types of claims, which do not clearly 
specify the need for a change in an interlocutors’ behavior. A third explanation 
is that human rights are “unbearably light,” meaning they travel across 
boundaries but remain “indeterminate, malleable, variable, and polyvalent.”75 In 
short, people frequently resort to human rights not because they are powerful but 
 
 70.  See generally KATHRYN SIKKINK, EVIDENCE FOR HOPE: MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS WORK IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY (2017). 
 71.  POSNER, supra note 15, at Ch. 7; HOPGOOD, supra note 20, at 21. 
 72.  This may be referred to with the Latin term iudicandum. Valentini, supra note 27, at 181. 
 73.  JAMES RON ET AL., TAKING ROOT: HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE GLOBAL 
SOUTH (2017). 
 74.  Leif Wenar, The Nature of Rights, 33 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 223, 229 (2005); See generally WESLEY 
HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING (1919).  
 75.  Michael McCann, The Unbearable Lightness of Rights: On Sociological Inquiry in the Global 
Era, 48 LAW SOC’Y. REV. 245, 248 (2014). 
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because they are vague, easily translated, and lacking in substantive content. 




 Each of these points is debatable. However, these explanations also overlook 
another possibility: that human rights claims draw on a reservoir of legal 
agreements that provide useful resources to claim-makers. Empirically, the spike 
in human rights usage exists alongside other trends in human rights treaty 
ratifications. While it is difficult to articulate a clear causal story, the parallel rise 
of human rights talk and human rights laws suggests the possibility of a mutually 
reinforcing relationship. 
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Figure 3: All Ratifications of UN Humanitarian and Human Rights Treaties. 
 
2. Law and Social Movements are Co-Productive 
This leads to a second assumption of a neo-constitutive approach: law and 
social movements are co-productive. Human rights legalization is a positive 
program that derives from and amplifies the impulse to make human rights 
claims. However, the relationship is neither linear nor static; it is uneven and 
dynamic. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was not a project of elitist 
global powers, but a network of representatives from Latin American states and 
the European intelligentsia that pushed for such a statement of principles prior 
to 1948.76 In the 1960s, Amnesty International began its monitoring work on 
political prisoners in the absence of an international human rights legal 
apparatus,77 and in the early 1970s, US Congress held human rights hearings, 
before the main Covenants had gone into force.78 In this period, activists were not 
entirely legalist; they did not single-mindedly pursue the development of legal 
treaties. Yet once legalization picked up pace in the 1980s and 1990s, these laws 
served as a rallying point for a growing number of lawyers, social movement 
activists, and politicians. A neo-constitutive approach to understanding these 
processes means seeing the world like a dense and dynamic network of 
relationships. Thus, one may think of law as both an outcome of transnational 
social movements,79 and a magnifier of local rights-based activism.80 
Human rights law, however plural and complex, also serves a few functions 
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for human rights claimants. First, it generates specific content that makes the 
discourse more precise; meaning that with legal instantiation, human rights lose 
some of their vagueness, or unbearable lightness. When one makes a claim that 
a government is violating a right to be protected from torture, this claim has 
specific referents in jurisprudence. Second, because human rights law is 
traditionally grounded in the work of resistors and the reform-minded, tapping 
this pool of laws means expressing a kind of solidarity with rights protagonists 
past and present. While this sounds almost spiritual, the notion of tapping is 
precisely the same kind of logic that popular constitutionalist theorists apply 
when considering what maintains a constitution’s legitimacy after its founders 
have past; the answer, in short, is continued use.81 A third and often unconsidered 
contribution that human rights law makes is that it provides activists with a source 
of sustained attention to their cause. Especially in a media environment blitzed 
with global crises, where the compassionate can easily lose interest and move 
onto another disaster, human rights bodies and courts provide a forum where 
experts—be they judges, lawyers, or NGO leaders—will continue to focus on the 
same case for years. For these reasons, human rights law and social movements 
reinforce one another. 
Critically, this does not mean that the force of human rights is attributable to 
norm internalization. A neo-constitutive approach is distinct from 
constructivism, which often presumes that rights win out in the marketplace of 
ideas because of people are socialized to believe them. While some people do 
believe in human rights, this does not mean that faith or brainwashing is a 
necessary condition for influence. Human rights can exert effects simply because 
there is a constituency that supports them, relies on this legal vocabulary to make 
claims, and generates a kind of shared currency for judging political actors. 
3. Human Rights Practice is Rooted in Real Bodies of Law 
A third assumption of our neo-constitutive approach is that human rights 
practice is rooted in very real bodies of law that have developed an extensive and 
wide-reaching network of practices. Critics at times claim that the human rights 
regime—embodying multilateral treaties regulating state and individual criminal 
responsibilities—does not qualify as real law because it possesses weak 
enforcement mechanisms.82 However, drawing equivalence between law and 
enforcement is an antiquated approach grounded in monarchist understandings 
of sovereignty and power. 83  The reality of human rights law is undeniable. 
Human rights lawyering and action command a great deal of global political 
 
 81. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Jürgen Habermas, Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of 
Contradictory Principles?, 29 POL. THEORY 766, 766–81 (2001).  
 82.  See generally Raymond Geuss & Lawrence Hamilton, Human Rights: A Very Bad Idea, 60 
THEORIA 83, 83–103 (2013). 
 83.  For legal theorist Brian Tamanaha, this reflects flawed thinking traceable to Jeremy Bentham, 
who, in modeling law as the actions of a sovereign, relegated international law as a whole to marginal 
status. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A REALISTIC THEORY OF LAW 154 (2017). 
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resources. Moreover, rights laws are now suffused into several regional and 
domestic legal systems, and these systems contain human rights trainees, experts, 
and specialists. The extensiveness—and indeed, the complexity—of this field is 
such that it would be difficult to erase. It might be the desire of some observers 
that human rights law be thrown in the dustbin of history, but pitching such a 
desire as a concern with reality is misleading. To the contrary, it may then 
represent a profound sense of un-realism to think that human rights law could be 
dispensed with, or that it will suddenly disappear any time soon. 
4. Human Rights Legal Discourse is Woven Into Political Interactions 
The fourth assumption builds on the previous three. The human rights legal 
discourse is baked into political interactions. However, this is not the same as 
assuming that human rights are an inherently positive or progressive force. A 
neo-constitutive approach is intentionally agnostic on this question. Instead of 
sweeping proclamations about the overall good or bad of the human rights 
regime, a neo-constitutive approach seeks to achieve a fuller understanding of 
mechanisms linking legal developments to social and political outcomes. Human 
rights mobilizations can have intended and unintended effects. Whether these are 
positive or negative is a normative judgment left up to the observer. However, it 
is certainly the case that the human rights legal regime was assembled over the 
years to improve practices among those responsible for organized violence. It is 
useful to ask if, and how, it might do so. 
This outline of a neo-constitutive approach to human rights should resonate 
because scholars are already doing this kind of work, even if their embrace of 
complexity and devotion to evidence-based mechanistic explanations does not 
earn as wide an audience as gun-blazing critical works. In the next section, we 
explain how a neo-constitutive approach helps create a more accurate picture of 
two big questions related to outcomes: (1) do states comply with international 
human rights law, and (2) does international criminal law deter groups or 





Neo-constitutive thinking could assist in understanding variations in state 
compliance with multilateral human rights agreement. The question of 
compliance is one that has commanded a tremendous amount of scholarly 
attention over the last fifteen years, especially in International Relations (IR). 
Much of the work in this field has a neo-institutional flavor, examining the 
“independent” effect that multilateral human rights treaties and bodies have on 
state repressive practices. In this approach, human rights law is modeled as an 
external legal force that may or may not act on rational political calculations at 
the domestic level. This separate-spheres ontology is coupled with a Humean 
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epistemology based on covariation. 
IR scholars present two divergent arguments about treaty effectiveness. In 
the first, treaty ratification constrains states by creating costs for noncompliance, 
which modifies state behaviors.84 Alternatively, treaty ratifications only occur in 
cases in which the regime would have complied with the provisions of a treaty 
already. Treaty ratification is thus a hollow act that reflects the existing political 
regime. As such, treaties have no effect on human rights compliance,85 or on 
international legal compliance writ large.86 
However, for all its statistical rigor, this line of research hides a few 
weaknesses. First, it makes heroic assumptions about how quickly and 
significantly law should exert impacts: most statistical models are specified in 
such a way that the researcher is looking for a relationship between treaty 
ratifications in one year and a change in human rights practice in the next one, or 
sometimes two, years. Second, the externality, or independence, of human rights 
legal instruments is assumed for the sake of statistical modeling, even though 
creation of human rights legal institutions is a long process involving several 
endogenous actors and institutions. If a state’s foreign ministry simultaneously 
handles various treaty negotiations at the UN, along with reporting to the Human 
Rights Committee and to the Committee on Torture, should one really model 
these processes as distinct?  And third, this research has traditionally been weak 
on mechanisms, passing over the multiple ways that human rights legalization 
and the politics of repression interact. Neo-institutionalist research basically 
leaves us with dozens of correlations between treaties and outcomes, but with 
little examination of the broader social or political context the influence 
behavior.87 
The neo-constitutive approach offers major points of departure from existing 
empirical research on compliance. The first occurs at the level of global law and 
society, where newer relational work challenges the notion that international law 
has a political problem. For example, Terman and Voeten argue that naming and 
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shaming via the Human Rights Council inspires action when countries receive 
criticism from allies, or ideologically “close” partner states; however, when states 
are criticized by rival delegations during Universal Periodic Review, they are 
unlikely to follow up on recommendations.88 In short, international legal 
mechanisms may be most effective when they are channeled through existing 
political relationships. The overall embeddedness of states in what are often 
highly social international institutions makes a difference.89 After controlling for 
a state’s probability of ratifying the CEDAW based on its general affinity to all 
United Nations agreements, Yonatan Lupu finds that CEDAW member states 
are more likely to protect women’s political (i.e., right to vote, run for office, and 
petition government officials); economic (i.e., right nondiscrimination in the 
workplace and equality in hiring, promotion, and pay); and social rights (i.e., the 
right to equal inheritance, marriage and divorce rights, and education).90 
The mutually constitutive relationship between international law and global 
political society is also becoming more apparent at the regional level. Helfter and 
Voeten uncover evidence that the European Court of Human Rights, whose 
decisions are only binding inter partes, somehow still manage to have an erga 
omnes effect across and beyond the region of Europe.91 Though by legal fact the 
Court’s decisions are meant to apply only in the state whose nationals brought 
the litigation, other states often react to decisions as if they are binding. When 
critical rulings are made regarding issues like LGBT rights in a single state, it 
sparks a wave of legislation across other states. One reason is that the ECHR’s 
decisions have “persuasive authority,” and change interactions between political 
and legal actors region-wide.92 Helfer and Voeten’s work is constitutive because 
it seeks to discover and explain the indirect effects of legal action on global 
political society. These regional relationships would be unobservable if one 
simply studied independent correlations, or asked whether single states in 
isolation complied with every element of ECHR’s legal rulings. 
Yet another global phenomenon captured only by work that adopts a flexible 
relational ontology is the changing nature of human rights data itself. As the 
menu of human rights practices monitored by NGOs and IGOs expands, many 
types of abuses are more likely to be observed.93 This is because the standard of 
accountability used to understand human rights is changing. What makes 
observing the temporal patterns of this process difficult is that no one individual, 
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organization, or government is responsible for defining it or gathering 
information by which to assess it. The standard of accountability is a constitutive 
process, through which transnational activists continuously remind their 
audience that the reality of situations “on the ground” are dire, and far short of 
legal norms and ideals. But the growing gap between ideal and real is by design. 
Human rights monitoring organizations, lawyers, judges, and other members of 
international civil society work to hold governments to increasingly stringent 
legal standards of behavior. When human rights data is modeled to account for 
this changing standard of accountability, a new picture emerges: globally, respect 
for human rights is improving, and this coincides with the increasing 
embeddedness of countries within the international human rights regime.94 These 
results are important because much of the neo-institutional theorizing in IR 
builds upon puzzling findings that are knowable only through macro-level 
statistics—like the apparent negative correlation between ratification of the 
Convention against Torture and worsening scores on indicators of torture.95 
However, it is likely the case that such correlations are a relic of a much larger 
and unaccounted-for changes in the nature of human rights data. Stricter legal 
standards have altered the way that actors in global society interact with 
information on human rights violations, in some ways making everyone harsher 
judges of governments. In short, law is constitutive of the human rights data-
generation process.96 
The examples presented here are global, or supranational relational 
phenomena. But the neo-constitutive approach offers a second, micro-level 
departure from common research on compliance, by shifting the analytical focus 
and unit of analysis away from an all-powerful “black box” state with rationally 
calculating leaders. Instead, individuals and groups are embedded in social and 
political environments that they, by necessity, must understand and navigate. 
Evidence from mechanism-oriented research suggests positive, albeit conditional 
relationships between human rights law and compliance given certain domestic 
political conditions.97 For example, Convention against Torture member states 
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curb torture in cases in which leaders are secure in their jobs,98 or when many 
legislative veto players are present and constrain political leaders based on rules 
written into law.99 
Indeed, neo-constitutive work disaggregates compliance. Many groups and 
individuals actively pursue rights-compliant or rights non-compliant behaviors, 
but sometimes these developments do not immediately affect aggregate “scores.” 
Modeling such dynamic patterns is challenging, but new experimental designs 
and methods for such analyses are increasingly common. Experimental 
interventions are designed at once to improve and systemically evaluate rights-
based programs. This is because it is difficult to paint a clear picture of human 
rights law if we simply examine the correlation between ratification of key 
treaties and changes in repressive practices aggregated at the country-year level. 
Doing so is akin to measuring the effects of a criminal justice system by overall 
level of crime in the United States for each year and state. Such an analysis is not 
able to track the constitutive processes—the individual level interactions 
happening between judges, lawyers, lawmakers, citizens, and any individual 
caught up in some portion of the legal system. Instead, to recognize the emergent 
properties of the legal system, one needs to examine the wide range of 
institutional and behavioral changes that derive from the practice of international 
human rights law. What makes law ineffective at one moment in time and 
effective in another is a generative process that is hard to observe. The power of 
an experimental design comes from its ability to equalize the complex network 
of mechanisms across treatment and control groups. Without the aid of an 
experimental intervention, observers and analysts are forced to grapple with this 
complexity using other social science tools. 
For scholars focused on strengthening the rule of law, legal compliance might 
be more effectively analyzed at the level of the legal task. Designing and 
experimentally evaluating specific modifications to existing regulatory schemes100 
provide analytic focus on local sources of non-compliance, which are often rooted 
in low government capacity.101 For example, in Haiti, evidence suggests that 
noncompliance is an unintentional outcome rather than a deliberate government 
policy, and efforts to augment bureaucratic capacity are effective at inducing 
legal compliance on a case-by-case basis. 102  Haiti provides a useful case for 
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isolating the relationship between misgovernance and human rights abuse 
because annual human rights reports, qualitative interviews, and original 
administrative data provide no evidence that the government purposefully 
represses the over 8,000 individuals held in prolonged pretrial detention, which 
is the largest form of illegal imprisonment globally. External rule of law programs 
focused on the legal task limiting the duration of pretrial detention in Haiti have 
helped the country act more in line with international legal standards. 103 The 
typical theoretical assumption of a purposely repressive leader or regime is not 
always valid. 104   Absent leaders who strategically repress to keep themselves in 
power, capacity-building legal interventions can be quite politically effective. 105    
B. Deterrence 
A second question that could be better illuminated by a neo-constitutive 
approach is whether international criminal law deters mass atrocity and core 
crimes violations in the future. Interest in this question budded when lawyers 
made hopeful claims about the potential for the ad hoc tribunals of the 1990s to 
prevent future violence and war,106 and then blossomed when hope was 
channeled into the Rome Statute, establishing the International Criminal Court. 
Even before the permanent ICC began operating in 2003, scholars questioned its 
potential to deter violence.107 Neo-institutionalist observers have maintained 
skepticism, finding little promise in the ICC because there is no global executive 
to order the arrest of war criminals.108 As such, there is very little reason for 
alleged or would-be agents of atrocity to fear arrest and transferal to The 
Hague.109 For their part, critical theorists find the Court to be not only impotent, 
but also insidious because it serves as a vessel of selective Western justice against 
African states.110 As one scholar notes, the relationship between African states 
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and the ICC is “more political than legal.”111 
More recent work, though, has moved away from narrowly rationalist and 
top-down analyses or universal criticism of international criminal law, toward 
focus on the agency of individuals and the entry points that these individuals use 
to engage with the institutional structures. As such, it allows for theorizing and 
analysis from the bottom up and does not need to be strictly rationalist to be 
ontologically tractable. Neo-constitutive scholars are not surprised by the 
political nature of international tribunals. Instead, they accept and analyze the 
way that these legal institutions operate through politics, and vice versa.112  A first 
lesson of this work is that, whether or not one agrees that the ICC or other 
tribunals manage to serve justice, there is little questioning that the demand for 
justice is a powerful force rooted deeply in routinely-victimized populations. This 
demand was the initial inspiration behind the ICC’s creation, to the chagrin of 
the world’s great powers,113 and it continues to animate annual meetings of the 
ICC’s Assembly of State Parties. As Jane Stromseth writes, “[e]ach year hallway 
tables overflow with reports and documentation of atrocities crying out for 
redress.”114 The ICC is built atop a groundswell of popular rights-based claims 
and politically charged calls for accountability. 
A second lesson is that tribunals’ interventions into particular countries are 
very much shaped by already-existing political constituencies. For example, in 
Kenya, an ICC investigation into 2008 post-election violence became a contested 
issue between “pro-compliance and anti-compliance” groups within the 
country.115 These groups can cut across other cleavages. In Kenya, those 
victimized by post-election violence are more likely to support the ICC, even if 
they are members of the same ethnic group targeted by the Court’s 
investigations.116 Survey analyses also show that victims who interact with the 
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ICC or the ICTY are relatively satisfied with their experiences.117 That tribunals 
attract political support for some groups seems a positive development, but it is 
also the case that nationalist or anti-justice groups detest international tribunals 
enough to mobilize publicly against them. In Serbia, for example, the operation 
of the ICTY has helped to produce a “war criminal cult” that refuses to accept 
responsibility for atrocities committed during the 1990s.118 
However, a third lesson is that tribunals are not simply captured by local 
politics; they also alter political interactions in a way that produces impacts. For 
example, Dancy and Montal demonstrate that an ICC investigation creates a 
“willingness game” between the ruling coalition and legal reformers within the 
country, who use ICC attention as an opportunity to file more claims against 
abusive state agents.119 The ruling coalition, concerned for its reputation, 
responds by allowing some of these legal cases to go forward. The authors 
support this argument with variable-oriented methods, showing a strong positive 
relationship between ICC investigations and domestic prosecutions for everyday 
human rights violations. 
Other neo-constitutive work fixates on the ways in which ICC interventions 
affect internal conflict dynamics. As of 2016, 80% of ICC investigations were 
initiated amid situations of active civil wars.120 Early studies were either very 
hopeful that the ICC could help end conflicts by ostracizing war criminals,121 or 
suspicious that ICC intervention would lead war criminals to dig in their heels so 
as to avoid arrest.122 More recent research suggests that the ICC’s impact is not 
uniform. Through a tactic one team of researchers calls “international legal 
lasso,” some leaders in Africa have sought to direct ICC investigations toward 
violent domestic opponents, effectively neutralizing them.123 As Mark Kersten 
shows, this can have the effect of actually encouraging rebel leaders like Joseph 
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Kony to negotiate, though the inability of the ICC to rescind an arrest warrant 
means that those same rebel leaders are less likely to make a deal.124 Together, 
then, these countervailing forces have meant observable but mixed impacts for 
ICC interventions. In some cases, core crimes violations have decreased in the 
wake of ICC involvement,125 while in others they has increased.126 In short, the 
ICC is not a universally positive instrument of specific deterrence. 
Still, this is not the full picture. Neo-constitutive research also demonstrates 
that the ICC may have a more general deterrent effect. While it does not 
necessarily stop specific actors from again committing core crimes after they have 
already crossed that line, it might dampen the impulse for would-be war criminals 
to engage in grave acts of mass violence. Such an inference is very difficult to 
make, and it means looking at a network of relationships, rather than examining 
any one correlation between two variables. For example, the empirical record 
shows that acts of mass violence have become far rarer in the group of states that 
have ratified the Rome Statute, even among rebels.127 Furthermore, the onset of 
ICC jurisdiction in individual ratifying countries like Colombia was clearly 
accompanied by a precipitous drop in certain forms of state violence.128 Though 
these pieces of evidence are by no means definitive, they suggest that the mere 
existence of the ICC, and the extension of its jurisdiction to new territories, 
makes agents of violence more hesitant to engage in certain acts. This response 
may be irrational; after all, the ICC has arrested and imprisoned very few bad 
actors. But just like Charles Epp demonstrates that a socialized fear of legal 
liability led American police departments to reform, it might be that a socialized 
fear of international stigma causes leaders to avoid attracting the attention of 
international courts.129 Only with an evidence-focused but flexible constitutive 
approach could one make such connections. 
For example, the International Criminal Court appears to deter atrocity, even 
though it does not have the support of great powers, nor does it significantly 
increase the risk that any given state agent will be held criminally accountable.130 
One reason may be that the ICC changes the perceptions of domestic reformers, 
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while also isolating targeted leaders in international society.131 
V 
MOVING FORWARD 
What does the future hold for human rights law and practice?132 This is 
certainly a very difficult question, but it seems like those answers offered by 
mainstream legal realists are limited. For neo-institutionalists and critical 
theorists, the human rights regime does very little, and will soon be swept away 
by political backlash. Yet if this is truly the case, then the purpose of this 
scholarship is rather limited in scope: it resigns itself to document the fall. 
Scholars should aim for more. This article presents a neo-constitutive 
approach to the impact of human rights and international criminal law.133 The 
intuition behind such an approach is that law and politics are conjoined spheres 
within society. It also presumes that there is such a thing as world society, and 
that within that society, human rights cannot simply be wished or argued away. 
Furthermore, given how sedimented legal systems are, one cannot easily make 
counterfactual claims about what society would exist in the absence of entire 
bodies of law. Instead of treating rights-based legal institutions as social units that 
mechanically produce outcomes in independent and linear fashion, researchers 
must study how norms and institutions generate relations that both “constrain 
and facilitate the reflexive actions of research subjects” in non-linear ways that 
are hard to observe.134 
Epistemologically, the neo-constitutive approach allows scholars to remain 
open to various research design techniques for assessing the reach of law and 
legal claim-making. As we write, scholars in human rights,135 comparative 
politics,136 and development economics137 are coming to grips with this new 
empirical landscape. If the new generation of experimental researchers adopts a 
flexible neo-constitutive ontology,138 then the results could be greatly productive: 
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instead of seeking to validate or invalidate the whole human rights project with 
every book, article, or note, they can think constructively about how different 
pieces of evidence fit together in support of more modest inferential claims. 
When shared, the outcome would be greater cross-disciplinary dialogue about 
how to improve lives. 
In our contemporary environment, replete with information and 
misinformation, rare is the intervention that is heralded as an unmitigated 
success. We are all aware that progress is slow-going, difficult, and at times 
impossible. Nevertheless, human rights institutions remain a site through which 
individuals empower themselves, seek meaning together, and resist cruelty. 
Instead of promising the oppressed heaven, or reminding them of hell, we should 
carefully follow the nature of their struggle here and now. 
 
